This paper describes current pattern of insurance coverage for precision medicines and, especially, companion diagnostics and explores what coverage would improve efficiency. We find that currently coverage is common for tests and treatments with clinical acceptance used at high volumes but is haphazard across both private insurers and Medicare for precision medicines in general. Analysis of the case of homogenous patient preferences finds that discovery and use of the test that converts an ordinary drug into a precision drug can either increase or decrease total spending, and might call for full or no coverage of test and treatments. Heterogeneity in marginal benefits from testing and treatment can call for partial coverage. Finally, varying threshold levels for diagnostic test results can lead to a demand curve to test and treatment that calls for partial cost sharing. Numerical examples and case studies of several test-treatment combinations illustrate these points.
Introduction.
Many medicines (and other treatments) work well for some otherwise apparently similar patients but not others. One of the factors known to determine effectiveness of a treatment is the genetic makeup of the patient or the disease. While physicians for centuries have honed the skill of determining which patients are good candidates for which treatments, the advent of "precision medicine" adds a tool in the form of a genetic test to predict effectiveness (or its absence) of a treatment regimen. The main advantages of such a test are avoiding the cost, side effects, and false hope for those for whom the treatment is unlikely to work, while at the same time reassuring those willing to go through the treatment that they will ultimately benefit. The widely-touted promise is that testing probably will both lower total spending (on the specific treatment whose effectiveness can now be predicted) and improve health outcomes by avoiding specific treatment side effects for those for whom it would have been ineffective (Aspinall and Hamermesh, 2007) . But are cost reduction and outcome improvements sufficient reasons for or necessary outcomes of generous insurance coverage of tests? More specifically, what is the optimal pattern of insurance coverage for tests and related treatments? It may well be efficient to have some cost sharing to discourage low value uses of testing and treatment, but such potentially improved incentives trade off against less protection from financial risk. The economic theory of optimal insurance coverage (Pauly 1968; Zeckhauser 1970) shows how to characterize the ideal tradeoff in simple cases, but what is ideal in this more complex case?
3 Some insurance coverage is now near universal in the United States but insurance appropriately does not fully cover everything a physician or patient might think useful.
Coverage is incomplete, with sometimes substantial patient cost sharing (as high deductibles, coinsurance, or copayments), both to avoid insurer administrative cost, and to inhibit inefficient stimulation to low or no-value use. Coverage may also wholly exclude some products and services judged experimental or overpriced. In this paper, I will outline some theoretical models of the ideal role of insurance in such settings with genetic testing and a specific treatment whose effectiveness is predicted by the test. I will contrast those theoretical prescriptions with what appears to be current practice in public and private insurance coverage.
Coverage of the specific treatment will not usually be a major issue in this paper, though proportional cost sharing of the cost of specialty drugs can add up, and high deductibles usually apply to all tests and treatments. However coverage of testing will be an interesting question, in part because some testing is still experimental, some insurances do not cover purely diagnostic tests at all, and many insurance deductibles (including the most popular plans on exchanges) will leave tests uncovered until the deductible is exceeded.
Coverage decisions by insurers involve both the binary decision whether to cover a test and/or treatment at all (presumably in part as a function of evidence on cost effectiveness), and the continuous question of what level of positive cost sharing to impose, given that there is to be some coverage some of the time. The pricing of tests, the alternatives to testing, and the effect of testing on the pricing of treatment will all be important.
An Important digression.
We will explore later in the paper the pricing of test and treatment when either or 4 both markets are not competitive (as opposed to prices resulting in P=MC). However, we should note here that it is very likely that the price of the treatment, especially if it is a drug treatment under patent protection and/or FDA exclusion, is likely to exceed marginal cost by a wide margin. This means that if we use price rather than marginal cost in the benchmark model, we are much more likely to find the test is "efficiency" improving from an insurer or consumer perspective because it helps to avoid a treatment which, in addition to possible side effects, carries a very high price offset. However, this saving is not true saving from a societal welfare perspective because (at least in the short run and without more complexity) the financial benefit from reduced spending on precision medicines to the insurer or the patient substantially overstates the benefit to society since the avoided price is well above the value of the resources saved. Pricing of drugs above marginal cost can engender a significant overuse of precision medicine tests even for treatments with small side effects, while overpricing of proprietary genetic tests can lead to underuse.
Heterogeneity.
In the general theory of optimal coinsurance, the key determinant of the level of cost sharing for a product or service, if it is to take on a value between zero and one, is the shape of distribution of marginal benefits (otherwise known as the demand curve). If patients are identical, with identical marginal benefits from care and identical disutility from side effects of testing (so there are perfectly horizontal demand curves for testing and treatment for everyone at risk), and if the population at risk can be defined and limited precisely, we either get optimal coverage being 100% or zero . We will first treat that case, equivalently one of a representative person or a world of identicals, before introducing heterogeneity.
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Here we assume that physicians provide the insurer with all the clinical information they know, while patients retain private information on the value they place on health outcomes (e.g., as measured by QALYs). With that assumption, it is variation in the monetary value attached to expected outcomes that can generate negatively sloped demand curves. These values are known by the patient-consumer, but not by the insurer. The conventional Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) measure already assumes away differences across subjects in the value of length of life (from successful treatment) versus quality of life (from treatment side effects), but there is considerable reason to believe that the monetary valuation of a QALY varies across people, based on both income and tastes. It is this variation that will be our primary focus as a rationale for insurance to contain partial cost sharing.
The cases just discussed furnish the primary and most consequential reason for "interior" cost sharing of tests or treatments in precision medicine, but there are some other possible rationales. If the cost of either test or treatment is very low, the administrative expense of paying claims may not justify the benefit of a tiny reduction in risk. If the plan has standard coinsurance rates that it applies across the board to categories of clinical services in the interest of administrative simplicity, it may choose to do so for precision medicine tests and treatment rather than make coverage even more complex than it really is. We also abstract from the problems raised by Filipova-Neumann and Hoy (2014) that a test may change subsequent incentives to engage in preventive behaviors (like monitoring through other tests). Finally, if patients underestimate the benefits of tests or treatment, there may be a case for value-based cost sharing (Pauly and Blavin, 2008) to encourage the use of undervalued services.
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Situations and solutions.
While positive cost sharing can improve efficiency by reducing moral hazard in the heterogeneous-hidden information case, the extent to which it will do so depends on how responsive demand is to such charges. The classic optimal insurance proposition is that, the more responsive is use to insurance coverage, the higher the ideal level of cost sharing. We will show that this proposition still applies to genetic and genomic testing, but it is more complicated than usual.
This proposition becomes more complex because of interrelated demands such as we have here-insurance design needs to take into account both price responsiveness of demand for tests and price responsiveness of demand for treatment. But one baseline finding is that if neither testing nor treatment responded to cost sharing and the combination always has net benefit greater than the threshold value, there would be no point in any cost sharing-just make care free. Later we will see what empirical evidence we have on this question.
Insurance and pricing.
Often the seller of test or treatment has patent protection or other source of market exclusivity and is inclined to charge the monopoly price (which of course can much exceed marginal cost). What are the issues in optimal insurance design when either or both markets are not competitive?
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There are three possible (non-competitive) situations here with respect to IP protection: (1) both test and treatment are patented; (2) testing is competitive but treatment is monopolized; (3) testing is monopolized but treatment is competitive. In case (1) there is also the issue of whether the same firm holds both patents.
If either the test or the treatment is monopolized alone, the equilibrium total price will be the same, since the monopoly rent can be collected at either stage of the production process, ignoring game theory issues. Adding monopoly control of one component when the firm already controls the other component will not add to profits since the monopoly price can only be collected once. If the firms are separate, the outcome is ambiguous and depends on bargaining.
The profit maximizing combination price for test and treatment when sold by a single firm is thus different from that if the two monopoly firms are separate. Compared to the absence of a test, the price of a treatment will increase when the test becomes available because its marginal effectiveness will increase. For example, if there is a 50-50 chance the treatment will work but the test picks out the half of the population where it will work, the treatment price will at least double (Pauly, 2009) . This increase in markup will also increase the bias in favor of testing as noted above. While a drug firm may not increase its price to match increased effectiveness if a test becomes newly available, its price for the specific treatment when a companion diagnostic already exists will reflect that value. There will also be an addition to the total price to reflect the ability to avoid side effects of useless treatment for those who test negative. Compared to the price of a single firm monopolizing both test and treatment, the price under bilateral monopoly will be higher unless the seller of the treatment subsidizes the price of the test.
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How do these pricing considerations feed back into the design of cost sharing in insurance, especially if prices sometimes vary?
The most important consideration here is the proof by Gaynor, Haas-Wilson, and Vogt (2000) that consumers cannot be made better off by monopoly pricing of insured services if insurance markets are competitive. While prices higher than marginal cost will discourage the use of care under a given level of proportional coinsurance, insurance firms will set coinsurance rates with competitive pricing of products and services that always improve welfare compared to that under "ideal" coinsurance with monopoly pricing (and higher benefit payouts). As a general conclusion, the dollar amount of cost sharing will be higher under monopoly and may discourage both test and treatment.
The other issue is whether monopoly pricing may make the entire therapeutic approach not cost effective from the perspective of an insurer with customers who attach lower value to outcomes (and who must pay the price charged, not the marginal cost). The answer seems clearly affirmative and it is unclear if there is an obvious work-around this overpricing.
Current patterns of insurance coverage for genetic tests and related treatments.
There is considerable variation across clinical conditions and types of insurance coverage-both the gross prices paid for genetic tests and genetic counseling, and for the prices of treatments whose selection depends on test results. In this discussion, I will focus primarily on tests and treatments for cancer, but will also comment on some broader patterns.
Prices of common genetic tests have generally been dropping as the technology for 9 genetic tests has become faster and more accurate (though new expensive tests are also being introduced). The price of a test obviously depends both on what genetic variation is being explored and how extensive a description of the genome in terms of genetic variants is sought.
Simpler genetic tests can now be obtained for as little as $200-$500 for common tests targeted at common parts of the genome, up into thousands of dollars for tests for all variants and all modifications.
In addition to tests per se, often genetic counseling is either required or useful. The cost of counseling has not been falling and generally exceeds $200 for a single test for a single treatment. The prices of treatments also vary greatly, depending on type and payer. The more restrictive intellectual property protection and the fewer close substitutes available, the higher the price.
Both the maximum reimbursement and the willingness to restrict use varies across insurers. Private sector insurers have the ability both to negotiate the prices for tests, counseling, and treatments, and (less commonly) to refuse to cover or only partially cover except on favorable terms. Some Medicaid managed care carriers also have this process. There is some consistency in coverage patterns. The ACA requires zero coinsurance for BRAC tests (two genes only) for women with breast cancer for testing and counseling.
The more common genetic tests (e.g., for Lynch Syndrome in colon cancer) are generally covered, though cost sharing may still vary based on overall cost sharing provisions in a policy. More rare and more experimental tests are subject to enormous variation, from full coverage (e.g., as part of a trial) to no coverage at all for a test deemed experimental by insurers. Beyond these obvious cases, there has been considerable variation in coverage of testing across insurers and over time. excluded coverage of common genetic tests even when they were not required by law. We examined more recent website data from large insurers (Table 1 ) and found similar patterns of coverage in principle for tests accepted as clinically useful. As indicated there, all large insurers (except for Medicare) cover genetic testing in general. But as the table shows, coverage for specific tests is irregular. In addition, websites tell us that the amount of cost 11 sharing varies with policy cost sharing provisions (deductibles and coinsurance) which themselves vary widely; for this reason they do not give an average amount of cost sharing. PDL-1 and EFGR (for Keytruda), and FISH (for Herceptin). The claims data also includes these tests used for purposes other than as companion diagnostics.) The claims data indicated that usually tests were fully covered by insurance (65% of claims) and that, among those claims where cost sharing was positive, its average level ranged between $100 and $200 depending on the test, with the median likely below the mean. Thus high cost sharing for the tests in precision medicine is not typical, but cost sharing still may matter because there is other evidence that relatively low levels of cost sharing for drugs can still have a decided impact on quantity compared to free care (Hillman et al, 1999) Over time, as more genetic tests have been clinically linked to therapy with specific drugs, Medicare coverage has become more extensive (Medicare.gov, 2016) . There is apparently still some variation across carriers, but most carriers now follow the "Palmetto" list of approved genetic and genomic tests. Medicaid coverage is more variable across state programs, with explicit coverage specification often not publically accessible. The ACA required that BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 tests and counseling be covered in full, but that is virtually the only regulatory regularity (Kaiser Foundation, 2015) .
Insurers explain their determination of coverage by appeal to the concept of "medical necessity." One large insurer (CIGNA, 2017) defines "medical necessity" in the context of genetic tests as having three requirements:
1) The test is FDA approved and/or performed in a CLIA-approved lab.
2) The test is medically necessary for the diagnoses indicated.
3)
Results of the test will directly impact clinical decisionmaking.
However, different insurers have different interpretations of these criteria (especially the second one). In some cases, as in the case of testing for BRCA, there is "a clear algorithm for whether or not to test {for BRCA mutations}," and sometimes testing is required by the FDA for use of a treatment, but in other cases pathways and protocols are unclear.
As genetic test prices have fallen, the willingness of insurers to cover them has risen-
an example yet again of the vacuity of the concept of medical necessity (Ho, 2017) . In addition to tests per se, often genetic counseling is either required or useful. The price of counseling has not been falling. Some insurers require genetic counseling before approving testing or treatment (CIGNA, 2017)
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The prices of cancer treatments also vary greatly, depending on type and payer.
Generally a treatment whose selection and use might be determined to be a test is in the (wide) range of $50,000 to $500,000, although some oral and generic treatments sell for less depending on patents and FDA exclusions. The more restrictive intellectual property protection and the fewer close substitutes available, the higher the price.
There is no information on the demand elasticity for genetic tests or counseling. The demand elasticity for cancer treatment has been estimated to be in the range of -0.01 to about -0.2. The demand elasticity for drugs in general is said to range from 0.2 to 0.6. Coinsurance for specialized cancer drugs is common in Medicare Advantage and Part B plans unless the person has purchased Medigap insurance.
Estimates of demand elasticity for specialty drugs cover the range from 0.01 to 0.2 -a wide range but one consistent with low demand elasticity (as deductibles or copayments). The theory of optimal coinsurance suggests strongly that in such cases, high cost sharing is not optimal. Explanations of insurer behavior in imposing high cost sharing in a desire for higher profits or lower premiums are quite unsatisfactory, because such provisions make insurance unattractive and thus reduce demand. Higher cost sharing may be a risk selection device, required precisely to discourage cancer patients from enrolling because their higher risk is not adequately offset by risk adjustment payments. Medigap insurance may also play a role in offsetting the effects of Medicare cost sharing, and diminishing any cost containment effects of Medicare cost sharing in curtailing moral hazard.
Relationship to our Analysis.
Our theoretical analysis generally supports the view that cost sharing for current 14 genetic tests, many of which appear to be cost effective, should be low. relative to cost of much of precision medicine remains to be done, as does analysis of the pricing choices in the face of government-enforced market power through the patent system and FDA grants of exclusivity. But these goals can in principle be accomplished and result in some lives saved for moderate spending.
Some Simple Theory.
We now provide a brief sketch of the theoretical possibilities for cost and health outcomes with and without genetic testing being possible. This discussion will characterize situations in which the use of testing is or is not undertaken in an efficient end-state outcome.
It will also describe the potential changes in patient behavior from a setting when no testing is available. Many scenarios are possible in theory, but some of them will be ruled out for institutional reasons. For example, in many situations, FDA regulations rule out the use of an approved drug treatment unless testing is first done.
Notation and description: π = probability of being in high risk population p = probability of genetic mutation, given a person is high risk This increase in benefit occurs with probability p.
L = side effects of treatment = (ΔQALYS)S(VQALY) ΔT
Where (ΔQALYS)S is the decrease in QALYs from the treatment side effects.
This reduction in benefit occurs with probability one. In case A, if (4) holds, condition (3) will hold as well. Since the treatment is chosen even when there is a "cost" of treating and causing side effects for those who do not test positive, it must be optimal to treat if it becomes optimal to test, that is, if the avoided cost and side effects for those who do not test positive are greater than the price of the test.
In case B, it is optimal to cover test and treatment if conditions (3) and (4) hold.
However, condition (4) may hold (given treatment, it is optimal to test) but condition (3) may not. This can either happen because the treatment does not provide net benefit for those who test positive or the treatment does provide net benefit but that benefit is not large enough to cover the cost of the test.
What is the impact of availability of the test on treatment volume and total cost? In In these cases, what should be the optimal level of insurance coverage?
1) If (a) testing provides more benefits (in terms of avoided cost of treatment and the value of avoided side effects of treatment) than its price and (b) the combination of testing and treatment provide more benefits (in terms of net QALYs gained and avoided future treatment cost) than the sum of the price of testing and the expected price of treating those who test positive, then both testing and treatment should be fully covered. Those for whom the expected side effects of treatment (e.g., prophylactic colectomy) outweigh the benefits will not opt for testing and treatment even at a zero user price.
2) Treatment should be fully covered but not testing If condition (a) does not hold but the benefits from treatment in terms of expected net QALYs gained from treating allexpected value of QALYs gained from treatment plus avoided future treatment costs
from those who would have tested positive minus QALYs lost from side effect of treating all -is greater than the price of treatment.
If both (a) and (b) do not hold, neither test nor treatment should be covered.
Going From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity.
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If consumers differ in the values they place on QALYs but are identical in terms of expected clinical outcomes, there can be variation in the cost effectiveness of treatment and testing, or treatment alone, around a mean measure of net benefits per person (value of net QALYs gained minus incremental spending on treatment and testing). The mean cost effectiveness ratio for alternative strategies combined with the shape of the distribution of these values will determine whether there should be insurance with partial cost sharing, assuming uniform financial risk aversion. In what follows, we provide both some illustrative hypothetical examples of different possible scenarios and insurance coverages and then discuss ideal insurance coverage from some examples of genomic testing to determine the effectiveness of treatment. To focus on the effect of testing, we assume that insurance coverage of the specific and expected future treatments is either 100% or zero, and consider positive cost sharing for testing and counseling. We first present two polar case examples of the cost impact of that availability (Tables 2 and 3 ). 
Implications for efficiency and insurance coverage
If initial state is treat all, do testing since it is a dominant strategy: lower cost and the same outcome unless there is high disutility to treatment. Insurance coverage of testing should be 100% if treatment is cost effective. If initial state is treat none, the efficient strategy depends on the value of net benefit from treatment compared to incremental cost of $7,000 per person at risk. Either cover the test 100% or not at all.
Treat none 0.1 (B-L) 20
These two numerical examples indicate that the potential for genetic testing to lower q Present discounted value of future treatment costs without specific treatment: $10,000
Case A: treat all Then cost of treating all (40.5) is less than cost of test and treat (42); gain from testing only if disutility from treating those who would have tested negative is larger than $1500. There is a much larger incremental cost compared to treating none but a larger gain in outcomes: ICER is unaffected.
These two numerical examples indicate that the potential for genetic testing to lower cost depends on the frequency in the population at risk of the condition the test will detect. If the condition is rare but takeup of the treatment is high, the test will reduce total costs because it will eliminate expensive treatment of no benefit. Conversely, if the condition is common but the takeup of the treatment is low (because of fear of side effects), testing may lower cost if the alternative to treatment is costly future care. In these dominance cases, full coverage of testing will be optimal. In both cases, testing will be cost reducing if the price of testing is low relative to the (net-of-future-costs) price of treatment.
But there can be cases in which testing adds to cost yet improves outcomes. Then the issue is the magnitude of the improvement in outcomes (net of any side effects) and the value attached to that improvement. Cost effectiveness results depend as well on the threshold value attached to health outcomes. If it is high, full coverage for testing may be optimal, but if it varies across the population at risk partial cost sharing will be ideal.
To estimate the net change in utility from raising cost sharing in such "interior" cases from zero to some positive fraction we need to calculate two effects of the change. One effect is that consumers are exposed to greater financial risk because their out of pocket payment now becomes positive. The monetary amount of that out-of-pocket payment for this high-risk population is the volume of tests (compared to zero cost sharing) times the out of pocket percentage. The risk premium that comes from the risk of incurring this part of the cost of the test is assumed to be some proportion of the incremental expected out of pocket cost. One way to approximate that additional willingness to pay to avoid the risk of having to pay the designated amount out of pocket is to observe the marginal loading on insurance at which many are willing to buy coverage. We assume that the marginal insurance buyer will 
Figure 1
We now present an example, using the data from table 3, of optimal and partial cost sharing: This implies that cost sharing of 30% is only a little higher than optimal.
II.
In the "treat none" case the reason for no treatment is the FDA rule requiring testing before treatment, not the valuation of the treatment. If the specific treatment and any future related treatments are fully insured, probably the optimal insurance for the test is no coverage, so as to impose some limit on the use of expensive treatments of low value to some consumers.
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Imperfect Test Predictability.
The model discussed so far of testing with a companion diagnosis to predict effectiveness of a treatment assumes that a given value of the test is associated with a single known probability of effectiveness of a given magnitude. For example, the probability that the treatment will provide benefit is p if the test is above a certain threshold and is zero if it is below.
But there is an interesting and more general case: when the value of the test is positively correlated with the probability the treatment will produce benefit B-when the expected value of the benefit pB increases as the test value indicates increased p. When is coverage for such a test optimal? Even more interestingly, we can in this case answer the question of how a firm with market power selling the treatment simultaneously sets its price and how insurers would respond by varying cost sharing.
Suppose the price of the treatment is C. At any given threshold, expected benefits are p(R)B-C, where p is a function of the test reading R. What is the optimal threshold for R from an insurer's perspective, and the associated price charged by the monopoly seller of the treatment? What is the inefficiency that arises from the seller's pricing?
The relevant comparison is the value of the change in expected total benefit when the threshold is lowered relative to increase in treatment cost per person. That level depends both on the distribution of persons by threshold value and how different values map into probabilities of effectiveness.
Assume that all persons with given risk characteristics are to be tested. If you know the ideal threshold, you can enforce it by making coverage for the treatment conditional on 25 evidence showing the person exceeding the threshold. However, beyond recommendations and FDA approvals for treatment conditional on some threshold, it does appear that sellers of treatments with companion diagnostics let insurers set the levels at which they will cover the treatment.
A surprising implication is that the behavior of the treatable population at various levels of the threshold and its associated treatment effectiveness define a demand curve for the treatment (even if subjective values of health outcomes are uniform). A small number of people with "high" test results are willing to pay a high price, but as the price is reduced more people are willing to buy. Then we can determine the price a seller of the treatment with market power will choose by using the usual monopoly pricing rule-comparing marginal revenue (along this demand curve) with marginal cost of production and distribution.
As already noted, how quantity demanded changes as price is reduced depends on two parameters: the number of people at each test value and the relationship of that test value to the effectiveness of treatment. Beginning at the highest price at which anyone will buy, with a bell shaped curve on test values, the numbers of customers brought in by lower prices at first increases rapidly and then falls off. It is not clear what assumption is plausible about how test values are related to effectiveness. What is clear is that, as usual, use of the treatment will be suboptimal if the seller has market power. We provide some numerical examples of different elasticities of effectiveness with respect to test value.
The box provides a numerical example to illustrate these points:
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Some Current Examples of Genetic Testing and Treatment.
The data on test and treatment cost and outcomes for three prominent examples of the use of genomic testing is displayed in Table 6 . Here we discuss what is known about those cases
and speculate about what it implies for insurance coverage. Proportion of users at each threshold who obtain benefit B: High 0.8, medium 0.4, low 0.2. This implies total number benefitting in each increment is 20, 20, and 5 with cumulative totals of 20, 40, 45.
Suppose the marginal cost of treatment C=1. Suppose that the 50 people who have medium test levels would at most be willing to pay 3C= 3. That implies that B= 7.5 and the maximum price that will bring in the first 25 is 6, and that which will bring in the last 25 is 1.5.
Revenues and profits at each "threshold":
High: 25 (6-1) =125; Medium 75 (3-1) =150; Low 100 (1.5-1) = 50. Hence the profit maximizing threshold is "medium" with price of 3 and demand of 75.
However in this example the socially optimal quantity is 100 since 45(7.5) -100, or 237.5, is greater than 40 (7.5) -75, or 225, or 20(7.5) -25, or 125.
As is usually the case in economics, profit maximization by a seller with market power leads to an equilibrium with a smaller than socially optimal rate of use of the product being sold. The reason is that the incremental social benefit of treating the lowest threshold group is (5x7.5) which is more than the marginal cost of 25, even though the marginal revenue from bringing in those 25 new buyers (by cutting the price from 3 to 1.5) is negative since the price halves but the quantity increases only by 25/75 or 33%. In what follows we assume that the alternative to testing and a treatment with large negative side effect is no treatment and no testing. We assume that surgery has negative effects on short term and long-term quality of life, but avoids future lifetime costs for this type of cancer.
Looking only at medical care costs, studies have compared the cost of testing and counseling all members of the population and the cost of surgery for those with positive findings with the future costs for screening for, biopsing, and future surgery and treatment for these cancers. The cost offset in terms of the present discounted value of related future medical costs is larger than the cost of testing and treatment. Unless a high value is attached
to reduction in quality of life from surgery, the net change in QALY is usually estimated to be positive.
30
Hence, compared to no testing and no treatment, use of genetic testing followed by prophylactic surgery for positive test results is a dominant strategy. It saves money and leads to outcomes which are better. It follows that testing and treatment should be fully covered by insurance to protect against the risk of becoming at high risk for this condition. Cost effectiveness has not been determined if a non-surgical alternative is chosen after a positive test, but cost reduction is unlikely in this case. It would be difficult to condition insurance coverage for testing on follow-up with preventive surgery.
Erbitux and testing for metastatic colon cancer. The FDA currently approves Erbitux (cetucimab) for treatment of colon cancer following a test to determine whether the person's genetic makeup has an abnormality or is "wild type" with no abnormality. Erbitux is only effective for wild type genetic profiles, and about 2/3 of those with colon cancer have this profile. Though one might suppose that a strategy of universal treatment might be reasonable, the FDA currently recommends Erbitux only after testing and a finding of no genetic defects.
The alternative to testing and treatment with Erbitux is a colectomy (surgical removal of the colon) or more frequent colonoscopies.
Studies find that, compared to a strategy of treating everyone at high risk with Erbitux without testing, testing and then Erbitux treating based on test results is cost reducing.
However, compared with usual care (no testing, no Erbitux), testing and then treating with Erbitux adds to total cost but improves health outcomes. If FDA guidelines are followed, it is the second case that is more relevant.
Because testing is a mandatory gateway to Erbitux treatment, we can consider cost sharing for testing as effectively an increase in cost sharing for treatment with probability p.
There is no benefit to those who test negative. The average $/QALY for Erbitux is $113,000 to 138,000 per QALY, lower value for the test-treatment combination than the conventional threshold of $100,000 per QALY.
Keytruda and testing for non-small-cell lung cancer. Keytruda is a new and expensive drug that has shown efficacy against non-small-cell lung cancer and other tumors. In the NSCLC case, the drug is effective only if the patient tests positive for PD-L1 and negative for the genes EGFR and ALK. In some cases, the drug is used if EGFR and ALK inhibitors have failed as has platinum based chemotherapy.
About 80% of NSCLC patients would pass both of the genetic screens just described.
The test and counseling to determine the status of a patient costs about $1000. Compared to a strategy of no testing and no treatment, there is a positive cost and positive health benefits from adding both testing and Keytruda. There has been no analysis of the costs and benefits from testing if all NSCLC patients were using Keytruda. Hence the case is similar to Erbitux but with a more effective treatment. The mean estimated incremental cost per QALY is $63,000 per QALY, below the conventional threshold.
Coverage. The average cost effectiveness ratio for Erbitux would often be regarded as above the threshold for efficient use of the testing and treatment program, but if there is variation across consumers around the mean ratio because of variation in the values attached to increments in health or side effects, there may still be demand for and optimal provision of coverage for the combination for those with high values. However, mandatory coverage by private insurance is not warranted nor is universal coverage for all Medicare beneficiaries.
Medigap insurance will also not cover costs of care that is experimental or not deemed medically necessary. value to a few more months of survival but wants to avoid the side effects of an aggressive treatment-but in that case there will be no demand for testing even a zero price and no value to insurance coverage of either test or treatment.
The relevant price here is, as before, the price of the test plus p times the price of treatment-any cost offset from avoided illness. The latter savings can be "taken off the top" so the percentage cost sharing depends on whether we analyzed the gross price or the price net 33 of cost offsets; cost sharing as a proportion of net cost will be larger than cost sharing as a proportion of gross price.
Summary. These cases show some of the practical range of considerations that would govern specification of insurance coverage for testing and treatment. In the case of BRCA testing leading to prophylactic surgery, the evidence that total cost is reduced by testing while the health levels of those who opt for testing and this treatment is improved implies that coverage should be complete for both testing and treatment. In the two examples where testing is required for treatment but one has a higher cost effectiveness ratio than the other, the ideal pattern of insurance depends on the extent and form of variation in values attached to health improvements. If it is small, and if the threshold value for the great majority of the population is equal to or greater than $100,000 (say), then coverage should be nearly complete Other companion diagnostics. We also examined the Tufts registry of cost effectiveness studies, a comprehensive listing of all such studies. We searched using the key words "precision medicine," "personalized medicine," "genetic," or "genomic." We found 44
articles that matched. Following the procedure in Glick et al. (2015) , we deleted studies outside the US or those that did not use QALYs as a measure of outcome; the resulting sample had 28 studies (including the ones used in our case studies above). Table 7 shows the overall pattern of results in terms of incremental cost and incremental benefits measured in QALYs. • US-based • Published after 2002 • Measured provided cost/QALY About 14% of the studies found the test and treatment to be cost saving, relative to the comparator, implying full coverage of test and treatment is optimal; this was a smaller fraction than the 28% of cost saving studies found in the sample of all studies investigated by Glick et al. Most of the studies showed cost effectiveness ratios below the conventional $100,000 per QALY cutoff, but eight did not. As noted earlier, these studies do not show the distribution of values around the mean estimate, but those studies with favorable values considerably below the $100,000 threshold would probably be good candidates for complete or nearly complete coverage of both treatment and companion diagnostic. However the case for full coverage or even any coverage of the 30% of cases above that cutoff is questionable.
Conclusion.
Our review of coverage for genetic testing reveals a trend toward a more general 35 acceptance of such tests as having clinical utility and therefore in principle appropriate candidates for insurance coverage. There is still a reluctance to cover tests deemed experimental and relatively high bars for the evidence that can make coverage routinethough in most cases the coverage usually follows rather than facilitates clinical practice.
Genetic testing to determine the effectiveness of treatment is still relatively new though growing rapidly. There does seem to be a common cycle in which three trends compete: Evidence for and use of genetic testing increase over time; insurance coverage (though present) imposes higher cost sharing; then test prices fall and coverage improves.
In principle, cost effectiveness studies could provide the basis for determining those tests so efficient that coverage should be 100%, but this determination may vary across consumers depending on their willingness to pay for health outcomes and avoiding side effects of treatment. So coverage may become broader but shallower.
The other conflicting influence is that new but initially expensive tests appear that do impose a financial burden but, with dubious evidence for their effectiveness or cost effectiveness, are generally not covered. Thus there is likely to be continued debate on how insurance should deal with both the testing and treatment associated with personalized medicine.
